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Incentives and the Supreme Court
Mark Tushnet*
Introduction
Good-government reform proposals like those offered by Profes-
sors Craig Lerner and Nelson Lund generally confront several difficul-
ties.  Details matter, but most reform proposals are understandably
sketchy.1  The details ordinarily would be fleshed out as the proposal
works its way through the process of enactment, but this process is
difficult to navigate.  The politics of good-government reforms are
messy because they are bound up with ordinary partisan politics, and
they are obscure because it is hard to understand why politicians
might be interested in (merely) good-government reforms.  This brief
Essay explores these difficulties as they arise in connection with some
of the proposals put forth in the article by Professors Lerner and
Lund.2
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I thank Adrian
Vermeule for comments on a draft of this Essay.
1 A related difficulty is that if reform proposals directed at a single institution were
adopted, they would have to mesh with the operation of other institutions.  Reformers typically,
though not always, do not think through the issues associated with integrating their proposals
with the rest of the government.  Sometimes, of course, reform proposals are comprehensive,
addressing legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, but then the analysis of how the re-
forms would operate in practice is even more difficult.
2 Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celeb-
rity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2010).  I note here some quibbles with their analysis that do
not raise serious problems.  First, their discussion of the Court’s deliberative processes relies on
information about the Rehnquist and earlier Courts, id. at 1270–71, and there is some reason to
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I. The Incentive Effects of the Lerner-Lund Proposals
The analysis of the incentive effects of the Lerner-Lund proposals
is incomplete.  Professors Lerner and Lund seem to ask how the peo-
ple now serving on the Court would behave if their proposed changes
were made.3  That, however, is the wrong question because the
changes would also affect the pool from which nominees are drawn.
Professors Lerner and Lund rightly focus on the Justices’ prefer-
ence functions.  To simplify in ways that do not affect the general anal-
ysis: Justices are interested in money, leisure, and celebrity.4
Professors Lerner and Lund aim to reduce the contribution that celeb-
rity makes to the Justices’ (psychic) income.5  That in itself would
change the pool of prospective nominees, as some of those who would
accept the job with the associated celebrity would find the overall
compensation less attractive than the alternatives available to them.6
think that those processes have changed a bit recently.  The chatter among Supreme Court
watchers is that the near absence of inter-Justice deliberation on the Rehnquist Court resulted
from the reaction of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and his colleagues to Chief Justice Warren
Burger’s mismanagement of the Court’s deliberations. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE
THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 33–35 (2007).  In reaction, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist used an iron hand to run the Justices’ conferences, a practice that Chief Justice John Rob-
erts may have relaxed. See id. at 358.  Second, their account is inaccurate to the extent that it
fails to discuss the role of the so-called cert pool of law clerks in shaping the discretionary docket
and the pool’s independence from the individual Justices.  Clerks participating in the pool cannot
prepare memos acting as acolytes for their Justices, and, as I understand it, they do not.  Third, a
minor point, but one of personal privilege: Professors Lerner and Lund assert that law clerks for
every Justice appointed after Earl Warren prepared bench memos for their Justices. See Lerner
& Lund, supra note 2, at 1291.  In 1972–73, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s law clerks did not do so.
The Justice read the briefs and used the memos written at the cert stage to organize his thinking
before oral argument.  Finally, the connection between the cult of celebrity and its asserted
causes—the use of signed opinions and the growth of the discretionary docket—is unelaborated
and the timing seems odd, with events in the early nineteenth century and the 1920s having their
effects only in the late twentieth century. See id. at 1265–67, 1276–78.  A causal account in which
discreet policy changes accumulate and eventually have a dramatic and unintended effect is of
course possible, but it ought to be provided.  If the causal account is absent or is implausible, the
good-government reforms Professors Lerner and Lund offer might have no effect on the cult of
celebrity surrounding the Justices.
3 See Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1281, 1294.  Their discussion appears to suggest that
the pool of potential nominees would change in ways of which they approve, but I find no sys-
tematic consideration of how it would change, or why the changes would be of the sort sup-
ported by Professors Lerner and Lund.
4 See id. at 1267–68.
5 See id. at 1281, 1303.
6 Here Professors Lerner and Lund stumble in assuming that changing the Justices’ com-
pensation would not affect the willingness of potential nominees to accept a nomination.  They
suggest that “a President would [not] need to engage in much arm-twisting to persuade any law
firm partner to forego a seven-figure salary in private practice to become a Supreme Court
Justice.” Id. at 1263.  This is simply wrong as a matter of economics.  Even if no arm-twisting is1302 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:1300
Anonymous opinions might reduce the celebrity associated with the
job directly, but other mechanisms proposed by Professors Lerner and
Lund operate by increasing the costs of taking the job.  Eliminating
law clerks7 obviously does, and so does circuit riding to the extent that
it requires actual physical presence outside of the District of Colum-
bia.8  But, of course, making the job “more challenging”9 changes the
pool of potential nominees.
My strong intuition is that, holding everything else constant, re-
ducing the income associated with the job while simultaneously in-
creasing the costs of holding the position would have a selection
effect, diminishing the average quality of the pool as high-quality po-
tential nominees discover that the alternatives available to them pro-
vide higher net incomes.10  Consistent with the proposal for
required given the present income associated with the position, reducing that income would
necessarily affect the nominee’s willingness to accept the position.  It is also wrong empirically.
In recent years several people declined nominations when approached, including Mario Cuomo
and George Mitchell.  Douglas Jehl, Mitchell Rejects President’s Offer of Seat on Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1994, at A1, B13; Kevin Sack, Cuomo Announces He Is Not Seeking Seat on
High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at B5; see also Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1263 n.25
(discussing Justice Arthur Goldberg’s resignation from the Supreme Court to accept the position
of Ambassador to the United Nations).  I should note that I find Justice Goldberg’s resignation a
patriotic act, hardly baffling as Professors Lerner and Lund seem to suggest. See id.  Admittedly,
Cuomo and Mitchell were politicians, not partners in major law firms, but the principle is the
same.  In any event, the seeming emergence of a norm that nominees must have some judicial
experience suggests that few partners in major law firms are in the pool of prospective nominees
(although the recent nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan may signal a new trend).  The
assumption that no one would turn down a nomination regardless of the compensation associ-
ated with it reflects either the legal academy’s parochialism or the acceptance by Professors
Lerner and Lund of something like the cult of celebrity.
7 Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1294.
8 Id. at 1297–99.  It seems to me that Professors Lerner and Lund assume that circuit
riding would involve travel to other courthouses, but it is not clear that this assumption holds
given modern technology.  Additionally, imposing circuit-riding duties on sitting Justices would
raise anew the constitutional question addressed in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803),
which upheld the reimposition of circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices, a practice which had
been abolished only one year earlier, id. at 309.  The Court relied exclusively on the fact that
Congress had reimposed circuit-riding duties after a brief interruption, that is, on a traditionalist
analysis. Id. With circuit riding abolished for more than a century, such an analysis is weaker
today than in 1803, leaving in place the textualist analysis—that judges are confirmed to posi-
tions with statutorily defined characteristics, which cannot be altered to the judges’ disadvan-
tage—that was at the heart of the challenge in Stuart. Id. at 305.
9 Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1294.
10 See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953,
961–62 (2005) (discussing the effect of judicial compensation on the nominee pool, leading to a
pool which may be more focused on the nonpecuniary benefits of judicial office).  Perhaps
Professors Lerner and Lund assume that their proposals’ marginal effects on net income are too
small relative to gross income to change the pool’s composition significantly.  If so, that assump-
tion seems in tension with their treatment of the cult of celebrity, which seems to assume that the2010] Incentives and the Supreme Court 1303
anonymous opinions, Supreme Court Justices might become relatively
anonymous legal bureaucrats with exceptionally strong civil service
protections.  Whether that would improve the quality of our law
seems to me to be an open question.11
II. The Effects of Anonymous Opinions
Professors Lerner and Lund’s proposal that the Supreme Court
issue anonymous opinions with unsigned separate opinions reinforces
the image of Justices as bureaucrats.12  In addition to their proposal,
this Essay considers several variants because examining the variants
helps to identify some difficulties associated with their proposal.13
cult of celebrity provides significant psychic income. See  Lerner & Lund, supra  note 2, at
1267–68.  Here, their analytic unclarity is particularly problematic.  Adrian Vermeule pointed
out to me that there might be two selection effects, one reducing the pool’s average quality and
the other reducing the pool’s average narcissism.  The effects might interact so as to increase the
average quality of the Court’s output.  I agree that this is a possibility, which is part of the reason
for my tentativeness in the text, but we would need a much more thorough analysis of these
mechanisms than Professors Lerner and Lund supply to be confident that their proposed re-
forms would improve the average quality of the Court’s work product.
11 Professors Lerner and Lund write that if the reforms they propose were adopted, Jus-
tices would be “less inclined to pursue individual glory and more concerned with the Court’s
overall reputation.”  Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1288.  The first observation is true; the
latter is more questionable.  Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine why Justices with reduced in-
comes would substitute concern for the Court’s reputation for their lost celebrity.  I would as-
sume that after these reforms, the Justices would substitute leisure for work, as we tend to
assume ordinary bureaucrats do by leaving the job precisely at 5:00 p.m.  It would be helpful to
have an analysis of the possibility of doubling or tripling the size of the Court; this is perhaps a
more obvious way of eliminating the cult of celebrity, although it is no less politically unrealistic
than Professors Lerner and Lund’s proposals.
12 Id. at 1302–03.  Here is an area where Professors Lerner and Lund could offer more
detail about the interaction among their proposals.  They reassure readers that the importance of
the Court’s cases would give the Justices an incentive not to shirk despite the anonymity of their
work product. Id. at 1281.  At the same time, their proposal for certification from circuit courts,
and especially their hope that such certification will bring larger numbers of “mundane” cases to
the Court, id. at 1288 n.166, would change the importance of the cases considered by the Court,
thereby raising questions about the persistence of the incentive against shirking.
13 I do not consider the possibility of reversion to the pre–Chief Justice John Marshall
practice of seriatim opinions because it falls outside the scope of the proposals offered by Profes-
sors Lerner and Lund.  The use of seriatim opinions by some courts does cast some doubt—not
much, I concede—on part of the causal account of the rise of the cult of celebrity in the United
States.  Both the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia use seriatim opin-
ions, although often with a lead opinion.  Peter McCormick, Standing Apart: Separate Concur-
rence and the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 1984–2006, 53 MCGILL L.J. 137, 160 (2008).
Before its replacement by a supreme court, the British House of Lords also used seriatim opin-
ions. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND IN-
DIVIDUAL S TYLES 42 (2007).  It would be interesting to investigate whether there is a cult of
celebrity associated with members of those courts, but my impression is that there is not, al-
though of course individual judges are well known among legal elites.  Seriatim practice seems1304 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:1300
The variants are: unsigned opinions with no dissents allowed and un-
signed opinions with signed dissents and concurrences.  Similar vari-
ants exist in other judicial systems14 and examining experience
elsewhere might provoke some thoughts about the variants’ potential
effects.15
I begin with a general observation, derived from a comment by
Thomas Jefferson on anonymous opinions.  Writing in 1820, Jefferson
referred to the Court as “huddled up in conclave” dominated by a
“crafty chief judge who sophisticates the law to his mind, by the turn
of his own reasoning.”16  Anonymous opinions, that is, can spur con-
spiracy theories that impugn the claim that the Justices are performing
their judicial duties.
Now, consider the specific variant in which the Court issues anon-
ymous opinions with no dissent allowed.  Within a court operating
under such a rule two norms compete.  One is a norm of going along,
in which those who disagree with the majority swallow their disagree-
ment and go along with whatever the majority produces.  The other is
a norm of consensus, in which the majority accommodates those who
disagree with it to the extent that it can do so without impairing the
ultimate judgment’s integrity.  The European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”), which apparently operates under the norm of consensus, has
been criticized for issuing opinions that are terse and unilluminating.17
The majority accommodates potential dissenters by issuing a lowest-
even more likely to generate celebrity for the writing Justice than the current practice in the
United States, and the seeming absence of a cult of celebrity elsewhere suggests that the cult in
the United States arises from other aspects of the legal culture.  For additional discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 36–41.
14 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) uses unsigned opinions with no dissents, as do
the French courts. See Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European
Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 618, 635 (2006).  In its decisions
on the merits, the European Court of Human Rights uses unsigned majority opinions, separate
opinions listing the names of the dissenters, and occasional separate opinions issued under a
single name (a practical necessity in the event that only one judge writes separately). See Lech
Garlicki, Judicial Deliberations: The Strasbourg Perspective, in THE L EGITIMACY OF H IGHEST
COURTS’ RULINGS: JUDICIAL D ELIBERATIONS AND B EYOND 389, 396 (Nick Huls et al. eds.,
2009).  In its preliminary opinions, the European Court of Human Rights uses unsigned majority
opinions accompanied by an indication of how many judges dissented. See id.
15 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (stating that “comparative
analysis . . . was of course quite relevant to the task of writing” the Constitution).
16 FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 307
(1993) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820)).
17 See, e.g., Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 307, 310 (2009) (asserting that the ECJ’s “justificatory style has often been criticized as
overly abstract, vague, and elliptical” and citing a former member of the court as saying that the
court’s “judgments read . . . like documents drafted by committee”).2010] Incentives and the Supreme Court 1305
common-denominator opinion that provides relatively little guidance
to litigants and courts subject to the ECJ’s review, often listing the
case facts as if they alone were dispositive.18  These effects might be
avoided by developing a going-along norm within the Court, but the
reforms Professors Lerner and Lund propose provide no reason to
think that such a norm would arise.  Even if it did arise, I suspect that
there would be cases in which the norm of consensus would kick in
anyway.
Next, consider anonymous majority opinions with signed separate
opinions.  The authors of the signed opinions might thereby generate
a cult of celebrity.  Worse, the existence of such opinions can provide
the foundation for identifying the authors of (other) majority opin-
ions.  Plagiarism-detecting software can rather reliably match the sty-
listic characteristics of individual documents.19  This matching can be
supported by inside-the-Beltway speculation about authorship, which
already occurs in connection with the Court’s per curiam opinions.20
Indeed, these problems would arise even if separate opinions were
accompanied by a list of the Justices who joined them, because at least
occasionally only one Justice will issue a separate opinion.  Those
opinions would then provide the database for plagiarism-detecting
programs.21
The only variant with any possibility of real success is the one
Professors Lerner and Lund offer: anonymous opinions and anony-
mous separate opinions, each indicating only how many Justices
joined the opinion.22  Even this variant is not without its problems.
Supreme Court Justices generally have written records—either the
prior opinions of those who have served as judges, or speeches, law
18 See id.  Professors Lerner and Lund express a similar set of concerns with the United
States Supreme Court. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1281 (referring to the Court’s “unin-
telligibly splintered decisions that so frustrate the bar [and] the lower courts”); id. at 1287 (refer-
ring to the Court’s “fact-bound opinions”).
19 See, e.g., Mary Pilon, Anti-Plagiarism Programs Look over Students’ Work, USA TO-
DAY, May 23, 2006, at 10D (discussing the growing use of plagiarism-detecting software by
universities).
20 See, e.g., Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2010/01/13/
hollingsworth-v-perry-bush-v-gore-and-manipulating-procedural-rules-in-high-profile-litigation-
impacting-the-political-process/ (Jan. 13, 2010, 6:39 PM EST) (“[I]f I had to guess, I would guess
that both per curiam opinions had the same author, Justice Kennedy.”).  Such speculation can
also fuel the conspiracy theories previously mentioned.
21 This “reverse engineering” of opinions might diminish the risk that Adrian Vermeule
pointed out to me that anonymous opinions combined with signed separate opinions might pro-
duce a lack of accountability for majority opinions while permitting Justices to be self indulgent
in their separate opinions.
22 Lerner & Lund, supra note 2, at 1282.1306 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:1300
review articles, and the like for others.  These materials would provide
the database for plagiarism-detection programs to match prior writing
with anonymous Supreme Court opinions.23
Eliminating the identification of specific opinions with individual
Justices might be possible, but effectively doing so is more difficult
than Professors Lerner and Lund imagine.  Their proposal might have
some effects on the cult of celebrity, but I think that it is important not
to claim too much about such effects.
III. The Politics of Good-Government Reform of the
Supreme Court
The discussion of the opinion forms used in other legal systems
suggests another perspective on the reforms proposed by Professors
Lerner and Lund.  Mitchel Lasser’s important recent work on opinion
form in France and the ECJ argues powerfully that opinion form is
deeply embedded in each system’s legal and political culture.24  For
example, Lasser argues that the French system secures legitimacy for
judicial decisions that are terse and uninformative in themselves by
accompanying them with extensive scholarly commentary25 and by en-
suring that the judges who issue them are vetted through an extensive
bureaucratic process.26
I do not suggest that anonymous opinions in the United States
would have to be accompanied by precisely the same supplementary
devices.27  Lasser’s perspective, however, does raise questions about
23 Perhaps the prior writings would have all been ghostwritten by law clerks, law firm
associates, or speechwriters and would betray nothing about the Justice’s personal style.  The
proposed elimination of law clerks would mean that Supreme Court opinions would be written
without such assistance and could therefore be quite distinct from a Justice’s prior writings.  I am
skeptical, however, that even ghostwritten works betray nothing about a person’s individual
style, at least over an extended period during which a number of different law clerks, associates,
and speechwriters provide assistance.  An additional wrinkle arises from transition problems,
which affect the politics of getting the proposal adopted.  A database of signed opinions exists
for sitting Justices, and plagiarism-detecting programs—and ordinary common sense—would
find it easy to determine which of the sitting Justices wrote an anonymous opinion.  (For exam-
ple, the distinctive writing styles of Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg would
persist into the era of anonymous opinions.)  These effects might dissipate as sitting Justices are
replaced, but the fact that the proposal would not have any significant immediate effects reduces
the incentive for politicians to adopt it.  For additional discussion, see infra Part III.
24 See generally MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004).
25 This would empower the scholarly community, a phenomenon that I suspect Professors
Lerner and Lund would view with skepticism.
26 See LASSER, supra note 24, at 39–40, 309.
27 Such a system would not fit, partly because Professors Lerner and Lund do not suggest
that anonymous opinions should lose the discursive quality of current Supreme Court opinions.2010] Incentives and the Supreme Court 1307
the possibility of altering existing practices with respect to opinion
form without altering other aspects of the legal and political culture.
Professors Lerner and Lund’s set of proposals, focused as they are on
the Supreme Court alone, do not address this possibility.28  Consider-
ing the incentives that politicians have for adopting good-government
reforms shows the difficulty of instituting reforms that would address
this broader set of concerns.29
The basic difficulty with getting good-government reforms
through the legislative process is twofold.  First, good-government re-
forms tend to have payoffs in the long run, but most politicians have
time horizons that lead them to severely discount benefits accruing in
the distant future.30  Second, to the extent that good-government re-
forms have benefits that accrue in the short run, politicians have in-
centives to identify the short-term winners and losers and convert
advocacy of a good-government reform into advocacy of a partisan
one, triggering ordinary partisan contention over the proposal.31  Typi-
cally, though not always, good-government reforms are adopted pre-
cisely because they have become associated with a larger partisan
program consisting of reforms in the political system as a whole, which
have been presented as good-government initiatives but also benefit
some identifiable and immediate coalition of constituencies.32  In this
way, good-government reforms accompany larger transformations in
legal and political culture.  It seems to me that the proposals of
Professors Lerner and Lund do not yet have the characteristics that
would make them plausible candidates for any serious politician’s
agenda.
As this Essay suggests, even the immediate implementation of
Professors Lerner and Lund’s proposals would have few short-term
effects,33 which is a serious obstacle to their being taken seriously by
I suspect, though, that a system of anonymous opinions would reduce the present level of discur-
siveness, both because of the pressures for compromise were a norm of consensus to emerge and
because an anonymous opinion’s author has less incentive to devote time to the opinion’s devel-
opment and polishing.
28 Put another way, Professors Lerner and Lund offer a partial equilibrium analysis when
what is required is a general equilibrium one.
29 I developed this argument in Mark Tushnet, How Different Is Writing Small from Writ-
ing Large?, 18 THE GOOD SOCIETY 16 (2009), a comment on ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS
OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL (2007).
30 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 17.
31 See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 66.
32 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 19.
33 See supra note 23.1308 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:1300
any politician.34  One important effect is to make the job of Supreme
Court Justice attractive to a different pool of people.35  Implementing
some of the proposals would immediately reduce the attractiveness of
the position to those already holding it, giving the Justices now on the
Court an incentive to retire sooner than they would have.  Interest-
ingly, although we know who the Justices immediately affected by this
change are, we cannot be sure about who will respond to the change
first.  The most we can say is that the eldest of the sitting Justices will
find the increased costs more burdensome than the youngest.36  Until
the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens, this had a slight political
tinge, with three of the four eldest Justices being liberals.  Although
the Court is now more balanced, in a few years the political valence of
age might change again.37
Seen as good-government proposals, Professors Lerner and
Lund’s reforms are not yet part of a larger package of reforms that
might itself form the core of a partisan agenda.  Judicial reforms have
on occasion fit into such an agenda.  Judicial elections, for example,
were advocated in conjunction with larger democratizing trends aimed
at breaking the power of politicians over the judiciary.38  Additionally,
Progressive Era reformers included judicial reform within their pack-
age of proposals to professionalize government administration.39  It is
unclear to me how Professors Lerner and Lund’s proposals might fit
into such a larger program.  Their good-government character means
that both conservatives and liberals might sign on to them, but for
precisely that reason neither conservatives nor liberals have the politi-
34 See VERMEULE,  supra note 29, at 66–70 (discussing the difficulties associated with
adopting proposals where implementation is delayed).
35 See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
36 As this Essay suggests, the anonymous opinion proposal on which I have focused most
of my attention would not have any effect on Justices like those now on the Court who have a
substantial database for use by plagiarism-detecting programs. See supra note 23.  The increased
workload that would arise from the proposed change in the use of law clerks and the imposition
of circuit-riding duties could place a heavier burden on older Justices.
37 I can imagine a political world in which Professors Lerner and Lund’s proposals would
be enthusiastically endorsed by liberals and opposed by conservatives, and that might be the
world a few years from now when the political process grinds its way to taking those proposals
seriously.  I can also imagine a political world in which the proposals would be endorsed by
liberals and conservatives alike, in a coalition formed around dismay at an “activist” Court, with
liberals and conservatives identifying different decisions as exemplifying activism.  I think this
quite unlikely, however.
38 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1097–99 (2010) (describing the rise of judicial elections
during the decades immediately preceding the Civil War).
39 See Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 854–55 (2002).2010] Incentives and the Supreme Court 1309
cal incentive to do so.  Perhaps the implicit endorsement of a more
bureaucratic judiciary could be incorporated into a larger program of
reform of a political system infected by corruption, but the fact that
that endorsement remains implicit suggests that it will be difficult to
do that, too.40
Sometimes, though, good-government reforms slip through the
political system.  An entrepreneurial politician chances upon the pro-
posal and makes it his or her hobbyhorse.  Other politicians do not
care much about the proposal, seeing no political benefit for them-
selves (which is why they do not sponsor it) nor much political harm
from its adoption (which is why they do not work against it), but want
to induce the proposal’s sponsor to sign on to their own initiatives.
Under these circumstances a good-government reform might get
adopted on its own.  So might Professors Lerner and Lund’s.41
40 The endorsement probably will remain implicit not for any Machiavellian or Straussian
reasons, but because bureaucratization is the long-run effect of the incentives the proposals offer
to prospective Justices, and it is likely to be extremely difficult to explain that effect in ordinary
political venues.
41 I note, however, that a condition for this process is that the proposal or proposals must
have no obvious partisan valence, and that, if nothing else, the tone of Professors Lerner and
Lund’s article gives it a rather strong partisan tinge.